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Abstract—Focusing on a femtocell communications market,
we study the entrant network service provider’s (NSP’s) long-
term decision: whether to enter the market and which spectrum
sharing technology to select to maximize its profit. This long-term
decision is closely related to the entrant’s pricing strategy and
the users’ aggregate demand, which we model as medium-term
and short-term decisions, respectively. We consider two markets,
one with no incumbent and the other with one incumbent.
For both markets, we show the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium point in the user subscription dynamics, and
provide a sufficient condition for the convergence of the dynamics.
For the market with no incumbent, we derive upper and lower
bounds on the optimal price and market share that maximize
the entrant’s revenue, based on which the entrant selects an
available technology to maximize its long-term profit. For the
market with one incumbent, we model competition between the
two NSPs as a non-cooperative game, in which the incumbent
and the entrant choose their market shares independently, and
provide a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of
at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Finally, we formalize the
problem of entry and spectrum sharing scheme selection for
the entrant and provide numerical results to complement our
analysis.
Index Terms—Femtocell, communications market, user sub-
scription dynamics, revenue maximization, competition, technol-
ogy selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enhancing indoor wireless connectivity is a major challenge
that hinders the proliferation of future-generation wireless
networks operating at high frequencies, as signals at these
frequencies suffer from severe fading and attenuation. Re-
cently, femtocells (i.e., home base stations) have been pro-
posed as an enabling solution to improve the indoor wireless
communications service in 4G data networks [1]. Due to
the wireless nature of femtocells, spectrum management for
the coexistence of femtocells and macrocells is essential to
realize the full potential of femtocells, which will be a key
factor in the successful adoption of femtocells in the future
communications market. Broadly speaking, there are three
spectrum sharing schemes (or technologies) for the coexistence
of femtocell and macrocell base stations [1]: (1) “split”:
part of the spectrum owned by the NSPs is dedicated to
femtocells; (2) “common”: the macrocell and the femtocells
operate on the same spectrum and hence interfere with each
other; (3) “partially shared”: the femtocells operate only on
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a fraction of the spectrum used by the macrocells. While
these three spectrum sharing schemes have their respective
advantages (e.g., spectrum efficiency, interference level), there
is an ongoing debate over which scheme shall be adopted [2].
NSP S2 makes entry and technology selection decisions 
to maximize its long-run profit.
(long-term)
Given their technologies, 
NSPs S1 and S2 make pricing or market share decisions 
to maximize their own equilibrium revenue.
Given the technologies and prices of the NSPs, 
users make subscription decisions 
to maximize their own per-period utility.
(medium-term)
(short-term)
enter
not 
enter
zero 
profit
Fig. 1. Three-stage decision-making problems of entrant and incumbent
NSPs.
Because of the potential of significantly improving indoor
communications services, femtocells are being adopted by
more and more NSPs and meanwhile, create new business
opportunities for start-ups which can enter the communications
market by providing femtocell services. Thus, it is important
to investigate whether or not it is profitable for an entrant
NSP to enter a market with femtocell services and with
which technologies (e.g., which spectrum sharing schemes).
From an economics perspective, we study in this paper the
problem of entry and spectrum sharing scheme1 selection
faced by a profit-maximizing entrant network service provider
(NSP) in a femtocells communications market. In particular,
our study shall quantitatively characterize which spectrum
sharing scheme shall be adopted by the entrant to maximize
its profit and under which conditions. Two markets, one
with no incumbent and the other with one incumbent, shall
be investigated in this paper. Throughout the paper, we use
“spectrum sharing scheme” and “technology” interchangeably
wherever applicable. The structure of our analysis is shown in
Fig. 1. Specifically, we consider a three-stage decision making
process: in the long term, the entrant NSP, denoted by S2,
makes entry and technology selection decisions to maximize
its long-run profit; in the medium term, the incumbent NSP,
denoted by S1, and NSP S2 make pricing (or market share)
1We implicitly assume that the entrant has decided in advance how much
bandwidth to acquire if it chooses to enter the market. This assumption can
be relaxed without affecting our analysis. The decision of spectrum allocation
(i.e., how much bandwidth allocated to femtocells and macrocells) is not
explicitly considered in the paper. However, spectrum allocation decision
can be captured if we treat different spectrum allocations (but possibly
with the same spectrum sharing scheme) as different technologies in the set
{T0,T1, T2, · · · TL}. Please see Section III for more details.
2decisions to maximize their own revenue; and in the short
term, users make subscription decisions to maximize their their
own per-period utility. This three-stage hierarchical order of
decision making can be explained as follows. Although dy-
namic spectrum management for femtocells has been proposed
as a research thrust (e.g., [20]), deployment of a spectrum
sharing scheme incurs a large cost, as it requires the network
infrastructure and femtocell terminals to be manufactured in
compliance with the chosen spectrum sharing scheme [2]. It
also requires the support of protocol stacks, which is costly to
develop. For instance, if “split” is chosen, then the femtocells
terminals should be designed and manufactured such that they
are only able to operate on certain bandwidths dedicated to
femtocells. Therefore, the spectrum sharing scheme is difficult
to change once deployed and hence, it is a long-term strategy
for an NSP [2].2 In contrast, an NSP can adjust its price over
the lifespan of its network infrastructure, although the price
cannot be updated as frequently as the users change their
subscription decisions. Overall, we can assume that the users
may change their subscription decisions frequently (e.g., a few
days or weeks as a period), an NSP’s price is changed less
frequently (e.g., several months or years as a period), while
an NSP’s technology is a long-term decision (e.g., several
years as a period). In order to evaluate and compare the
long-term profitability of networks with different technologies,
the entrant NSP needs to predict its maximum profit for
each available technology. To maximize revenue given the
technology and the associated cost, the NSP needs to know
the users’ aggregate demand and their willingness to pay for
the service, and then choose their optimal prices. Hence, we
study first users’ dynamic decisions as to whether or not they
subscribe to the entrant for communications services (i.e., the
short-term problem), then revenue-maximizing pricing strate-
gies (i.e., the medium-term problem), and finally entry and
technology selection for the potential entrant (i.e., the long-
term problem). A similar hierarchical analysis was considered
in [3] in the contexts of Internet markets. Note that our study
of user subscription dynamics provides a deeper understanding
of the users’ subscription decisions than directly assuming a
certain form of demand function (e.g., [3]), since our study
characterizes both the dynamics and equilibrium point in the
process of users’ subscription decisions.
When more users share the same network infrastructure,
congestion effects are typically observed in communications
networks and especially in wireless networks where interfer-
ences add to the difficulty in spectrum management [9][14]. In
economics terms, congestion effects can be classified as a type
of negative network externalities [27]. To capture congestion
effects, we assume that the entrant provides each user with a
QoS which is modeled as a non-increasing function in terms
of the number of subscribers. In the first part of this paper, we
focus on a market with no incumbent. By jointly considering
the provided QoS and the charged price, users can dynamically
decide whether or not to subscribe to the entrant. Under
2Note that once the long-term spectrum sharing scheme is determined,
dynamic spectrum management in femtocells is still possible (e.g., dynamic
frequency hopping among femtocell users depending on certain criteria such
as their instantaneous channel conditions).
the assumption that users make their subscription decisions
based on the most recent QoS and the current price, we show
that, for any QoS function and price, there exists a unique
equilibrium point of the user subscription dynamics at which
the number of subscribers does not change. Given a spectrum
sharing scheme, if the QoS degrades too fast when more
users subscribe to the entrant, the user subscription dynamics
may not converge to the equilibrium point. Hence, we find a
sufficient condition for the QoS function to ensure the global
convergence of the user subscription dynamics. We also derive
upper and lower bounds on the optimal price and market share
that maximize the entrant’s revenue. With linearly-degrading
QoS functions (which we show can approximate very well
the actual QoS functions), we obtain the optimal price in
a closed form. Then, the entrant can select a technology
out of its available options such that its long-term profit is
maximized. Next, we turn to the analysis of a market with
one incumbent in the second part of our paper. For the
convenience of analysis, we assume that the incumbent has
sufficient resources to provide each subscriber a guaranteed
QoS (or to be more precise, a QoS that degrades sufficiently
slowly such that it can be approximated as a constant without
losing much accuracy).3 Given the provided QoS and the
charged prices, users dynamically select the NSP that yields
a higher (positive) utility. We first show that, for any prices,
the considered user subscription dynamics always admits a
unique equilibrium point, at which no user wishes to change
its subscription decision. We next obtain a sufficient condition
for the QoS functions to guarantee the convergence of the user
subscription dynamics. Then, we analyze competition between
the two NSPs. Specifically, modeled as a strategic player in
a non-cooperative game, each NSP aims to maximize its own
revenue by selecting its own market share while regarding the
market share of its competitor as fixed. This is in sharp contrast
with the existing related literature which typically studies price
competition among NSPs. For the formulated market share
competition game, we derive a sufficient condition on the QoS
function that guarantees the existence of at least one pure Nash
equilibrium (NE). Finally, we formalize the problem of entry
and spectrum sharing scheme selection for the entrant, and
complete our analysis by showing numerical results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews related work, and Section III describes the model. In
Sections IV and V, we consider a market with no and with
one incumbent, respectively, to study the user subscription dy-
namics and revenue maximization. The problem of technology
selection is formalized in Section VI, and numerical results are
shown in Section VII. Finally, concluding remarks are offered
in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, communications markets have been attracting
an unprecedented amount of attention from various research
communities, due to their rapid expansion. For instance,
3The assumption of a constant QoS is relaxed in the subsequent work [19],
where we focus the capacity investment decision and consider heterogeneity
in the users’ data demands as well.
3[2] compared the profitability of different spectrum sharing
schemes in a femtocell market, whereas the user subscription
dynamics and the problem of spectrum sharing scheme se-
lection were neglected. In [3], the authors studied an Internet
market and derived the optimal capacity investments for In-
ternet service providers under various regulation policies. [4]
studied technology adoption and competition between incum-
bent and emerging network technologies. Nevertheless, only
constant QoS functions were considered in [4]. [5] investigated
market dynamics emerging when next-generation networks
and conventional networks coexist, by applying a market
model that consists of content providers, NSPs, and users.
Nevertheless, the level of QoS that a certain technology can
provide was not considered in the model. In [6], the authors
showed that non-cooperative communications markets suffer
from unfair revenue distribution among NSPs and proposed a
revenue-sharing mechanism that requires cooperation among
NSPs. The behavior of users and its impact on the revenue
distribution, however, were not explicitly considered in [6].
Without considering the interplay between different NSPs,
the authors in [7] formulated a rate allocation problem by
incorporating the participation of content providers into the
model, and derived equilibrium prices and data rates. Another
paper related to our work is [8] in which the authors examined
the evolution of network sizes in wireless social community
networks. A key assumption, based on which equilibrium was
derived, is that a social community network provides a higher
QoS to each user as the number of subscribers increases. While
this assumption is valid if network coverage is the dominant
factor determining the QoS or positive network externalities
exist, it does not capture QoS degradation due to, for instance,
user traffic congestion incurred at an NSP. [9] focused on
a communications market with congestion costs and studied
efficiency loss in terms of social welfare in both monopoly
and oligopoly markets. However, an implicit assumption in
[9] is that users are homogeneous in the sense that their
valuations of QoS are the same. In [12], the authors considered
users’ time-dependent utilities and proposed time-dependent
pricing schemes that maximize either social welfare or the
service provider’s revenue. Although congestion effects were
taken into account, the convergence of the user subscription
dynamics and competition between NSPs were not studied.
III. MODEL
In this section, we provide a general model for the NSPs
and users in a femtocell communications market. Note that in
addition to femtocell markets, our model also applies to other
communications markets such as cognitive radio markets.
A. NSPs
Consider a femtocell market with one incumbent NSP and
a potential entrant NSP, denoted by S1 and S2, respectively.
In the paper, we focus on the entry and technology selection
for the entrant. Thus, it is assumed that the incumbent NSP S1
has already deployed its technology, whereas the entrant NSP
S2, if it decides to enter the market, can select a technology
from its L available options, denoted by {T1, T2, · · · TL},
to maximize its long-term profit. It should be pointed out
that we use L instead of a specific integer to keep the
model general. For the completeness of definition, we use
T0 = “Not Enter” to represent that the entrant chooses not
to enter the market, which yields zero long-term profit. In
our considered scenario, a technology represents a spectrum
sharing scheme and the available options for the entrant are
“split”, “common”, and “partially shared” (or a subset of
these three) in addition to “Not Enter”, whereas the decision
of spectrum allocation (i.e., how much bandwidth allocated
to femtocells and macrocells) is not explicitly considered
in the paper. However, the spectrum allocation decision can
be captured if we treat different spectrum allocations (but
possibly with the same spectrum sharing scheme) as different
technologies in the set {T0, T1, T2, · · · TL}. Moreover, we can
also incorporate the entrant’s network capacity decision into
our model by considering different capacities (but possibly
with the same spectrum sharing scheme and/or spectrum
allocation) as different technologies. Thus, a technology can be
considered as a combination of resources (e.g., spectrum) and
the way to utilize available resources. Note that, as we stated in
Section I, technology selection is a long-term decision, while
users’ subscription and NSPs’ pricing decisions are short-term
and medium-term, respectively. Hence, the incumbent cannot
change its technology regardless of whether the entrant enters
the market or not [3]. We also assume that the incumbent
NSP S1 has sufficient resources (e.g., network capacity) while
the entrant NSP S2 does not. An example that fits into our
assumptions on the NSPs is that the entrant is a small start-
up. Hence, the QoS provided by the incumbent degrades much
more slowly than that provided by the entrant and can be
approximated as a constant without losing much accuracy (see
Fig. 4 and its explanation for more details). On the other
hand, as in [15][18] where the authors considered congestion
effects because of limited resources, we consider that the QoS
provided by the entrant NSP S2 degrades with the number of
its subscribers. Let λi be the fraction of users subscribing to
NSP Si for i = 1, 2. Then λ1 and λ2 satisfy λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 and
λ1 +λ2 ≤ 1. Also, let qi be the QoS provided by NSP Si for
i = 1, 2. We assume that q1 is independent of λ1 while q2 is
non-increasing in λ2. We use a function gl(·) defined on [0, 1]
to express the QoS provided by NSP S2 as q2 = gl(λ2), if NSP
S2 selects Tl as its technology. We suppress the subscript Tl
when we analyze user subscription dynamics and NSP pricing
decisions for notional convenience. Note that the QoS metric
can be anything that users care about (e.g., throughput, delay,
etc.). By considering average (normalized) throughput as the
QoS metric, we shall discuss in Section VII how to derive the
QoS function as a function of the number of subscribers. If the
QoS is subject to multiple factors (e.g., throughput and delay),
then we can express the QoS as a multi-variable function that
takes into account all these factors.
B. Users
There are a continuum of users that can potentially subscribe
to one of the NSPs for communication services. The contin-
uum model approximates well the real user population if there
4are a sufficiently large number of users in the market so that
each individual user is negligible. As in [8][14], we assume
throughout this paper that each user can subscribe to at most
one NSP at any time instant. Users are heterogeneous in the
sense that they may value the same level of QoS differently.
Each user k is characterized by a non-negative real number
αk, which represents its valuation of QoS. Specifically, when
user k subscribes to NSP Si, its utility is given by
uk,i = αkqi − pi, (1)
where pi is the subscription price charged by NSP Si, for i =
1, 2. Note that no other fees are charged by the NSPs. Users
that do not subscribe to either of the two NSPs obtain zero
utility. In (1), the product of the QoS and the valuation of QoS
represents benefit received by a user and the price represents
cost. We assume that a user’s utility is benefit from the service
minus monetary cost. The unit of user k’s valuation of QoS
(i.e., αk) is chosen such that αkqi has the same unit with that
of the payment pi, for i = 1, 2. Note that in our model the
NSPs are allowed to engage in neither QoS discrimination nor
price discrimination. That is, all users subscribing to the same
NSP receive the same QoS and pay the same subscription
price.
Now, we impose assumptions on the QoS function of NSP
S2, user subscription decisions, and the users’ valuations of
QoS as follows.
Assumption 1: For any technology Tl, l = 1, 2, · · · , L, g(·)
is a non-increasing and continuously differentiable4 function,
and 0 < g(λ2) < q1 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1].
Assumption 2: Each user k subscribes to NSP Si if uk,i >
uk,j and uk,i ≥ 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. If uk,1 = uk,2 ≥
0, user k subscribes to NSP S1.5
Assumption 3: The users’ valuations of QoS follow a prob-
ability distribution whose probability density function (PDF)
f(·) is strictly positive and continuous on [0, β] for some
β > 0. For completeness of definition, we have f(α) = 0
for all α /∈ [0, β]. The cumulative density function (CDF) is
given by F (α) =
∫ α
−∞
f(x)dx for all α ∈ R.
We briefly discuss the above three assumptions. Assump-
tion 1 captures congestion effects that users experience when
subscribing to NSP S2 with limited resources. Since NSP S1
has more resources than NSP S2, it is natural that 0 < g(λ2) <
q1 for λ2 ∈ [0, 1] (see Fig. 4 for illustration). Assumption 2 can
be interpreted as a rational subscription decision. A rational
user will subscribe to the NSP that provides a higher utility
if at least one NSP provides a non-negative utility, and to
neither NSP otherwise. Assumption 3 can be considered as an
expression of user diversity in terms of the valuations of QoS.
The lower bound on the interval is set as zero to simplify the
analysis, and as considered in [2], this will be the case when
4Since g(·) is defined on [0, 1], we use a one-sided limit to define the
derivative of g(·) at 0 and 1, i.e., g′(0) = limλ2→0+ [g(λ2)−g(0)]/(λ2−0)
and g′(1) = limλ2→1− [g(λ2)− g(1)]/(λ2 − 1).
5Specifying an alternative tie-breaking rule (e.g., random selection between
the two NSPs) in case of uk,1 = uk,2 ≥ 0 will not affect the analysis of
this paper, since the fraction of indifferent users is zero under Assumption
3 and thus the revenue of the NSPs is independent of the tie-breaking rule.
A similar remark holds for the tie-breaking rule between subscribing and not
subscribing in case of uk,i = 0 ≥ uk,j for i, j = {1, 2} such that i 6= j.
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Fig. 2. User subscription dynamics in a market with no incumbent. u2,k =
αk q¯2 − δλ2 + βλ
γ
2
− p2. p2 = 0.3, q¯2 = 1.0, δ = 0.8, and γ = 0.2.
δ = 1.2 (upper) and δ = 0.8 (lower).
there is enough diversity in the users’ valuations of QoS so
that there are non-subscribers for any positive price.
C. Assumptions and Remarks
In the following, we list important assumptions made in
this paper to further clarify our model and the scenario that
we focus on.
a. Constant QoS provided by the incumbent: The in-
cumbent has sufficient (or over-provisioned) resources, such
as available spectrum, and thus, it can provide a constant QoS
to each user regardless of the number of subscribers.
b. No positive network externalities: The QoS provided
by the entrant NSP is (weakly) decreasing in the number of
its subscribers.
c. Lower QoS provided by the entrant than by the
incumbent: The QoS provided by the entrant is lower than
that provided by the incumbent.
d. Pricing-taking users: Users take the prices set by the
NSPs as given, rather than anticipating the impacts of their
decisions on the prices.
e. No switching cost: There is no cost, referred to as
switching cost, incurred when users change their subscription
decisions (see Section IV-A for more details).
Before proceeding with the analysis, we explain some of
the assumptions in the following remarks.
Remark 1 (Constant QoS provided by the incumbent):
Given sufficient resources, the QoS provided by the incumbent
degrades sufficiently slowly such that it can be approximated
as a constant without losing much accuracy (see Fig. 4 for
more details). If the qualities of services provided by both the
incumbent and the entrant are degrading as more users sub-
scribe, then the price and the degradable QoS will jointly affect
the users’ subscription decisions. Although the corresponding
quantitative results will be different, the qualitative results
remain unchanged. For example, the entrant NSP providing
a uniformly lower QoS needs to charge a lower price in order
to maximize its revenue.
Remark 2 (No positive network externalities): We note that
5compared to positive network externalities,6 negative network
externalities are typically considered as dominating effects
in wireless networking research, including femtocell research
(e.g., [2]). For instance, when more users subscribe, congestion
and interferences become intolerable, if the network resource
(e.g., capacity) is not sufficient, and will significantly affect
the users’ experiences. In general, suppressing the positive
network externalities while only focusing on negative network
effects (i.e., congestion effects) is a common approach in
wireless networking and some operational research to studying
the interaction among multiple network service providers
(see, e.g., [2][3][9][10][14][15][16] and references therein). If
positive network externalities are also taken into account in
our model, there may exist multiple and possibly unstable
equilibrium points in the user subscription dynamics. By
considering the utility function ui,k = αk q¯i − δλi + φλγi − pi
for user k where 0 ≤ φ < γ, γ < 1, and φλγi captures the
positive network externalities), we show in Fig. 2 the user
subscription dynamics with positive network externalities in a
market with no incumbent. The details of specifying the user
subscription dynamics are provided in Section IV-A. We see
that if δ = 0.8 (i.e., not too large compared to q¯2 = 1.0, or the
effects of negative externalities do not increase significantly
when more users subscribe), then the convergence can be
observed (from different starting points). Fig. 2 only shows a
few instances for the ease of illustration, while more numerical
results can be shown to support our statement. Note that,
because of the term φλγi with γ < 1 representing the positive
network externalities, we cannot theoretically guarantee the
convergence starting from any initial points and given any
charged price. Nevertheless, with γ ≥ 1, it can be shown based
on contraction mapping [24] that the existence of a unique
equilibrium point and the convergence can be guaranteed for
any charged price and any initial point λ02 ∈ [0, 1] if the
condition [
max
α∈[0,β]
f(α)
]
· φγ + δ
q¯2
< 1 (2)
is satisfied. We see from (2) that δ cannot be too large given
φ and γ. This is similar to our derived sufficient condition
for the convergence of user subscription dynamics without
positive network externalities. Similar results hold for the
market with one incumbent, and are not shown here for brevity.
A comprehensive investigation of the coexistence of both
positive and negative network externalities will be left for our
future work.
Remark 3 (Lower QoS provided by the entrant than by
the incumbent): Given the three-stage decisions shown in
Fig. 1, we implicitly assume that the NSP can afford any
available technology at the beginning and hence, there is no
need to “upgrade” the initially chosen technology afterwards.
In general, there are two types of constraints – budget and
technology7 – that limit the entrant’s technology selection.
“No budget constraint” is assumed in the sense that the
6A primary source of positive network externalities is the (supply-side)
economies of scale. Specifically, as there are more subscribers in a femtocell
network, the NSP can make an investment to improve the service quality.
7Recall that a technology can be considered as a combination of resources
(e.g., spectrum) and the way to utilize available resources.
entrant can choose any technologies which are available for
its selection. Thus, technology selection is primarily subject to
the technology availability. Specifically, we focus on the case
in which the technology available for the entrant is inferior to
the incumbent’s in terms of QoS provisioning (i.e., g(λ2) < q1
for λ2 ∈ [0, 1]). In particular, in the case where the entrant has
fewer resources than the incumbent (but the way to utilize the
resources, e.g., spectrum sharing scheme, is the same), the
QoS offered by the entrant will be lower than that offered by
the incumbent (see, e.g., Fig. 4). This situation may arise in
several practical scenarios. For example, if the incumbent is a
wireless operator serving primary users while the incumbent
operates a cognitive radio network serving secondary users
that only opportunistically access to the “spectrum holes”.
Another scenario is that upon the entrant’s entry into a
femtocell market, only very limited spectrum is available,
while the incumbent has already obtained a much larger range
of spectrum. In each of these scenarios, we expect that the QoS
provided by the entrant is not as good as the incumbent’s, even
though the incumbent’s budget is sufficient to cover its entry
and technology selection.
Remark 4 (Price-taking users): The assumption of price-
taking users is reasonable when there are a sufficiently large
number potential subscribers. In such cases, the impact of a
single individual’s subscription decision on the decisions of the
NSPs is negligible. In this paper, we use a continuum model
to analyze the case of a sufficiently large number potential
subscribers.
Remark 5 (Applicability of our model): Besides the fem-
tocell market we focus on, our proposed model applies to
a number of other communications markets. In particular,
we can apply the model to study the spectrum acquisition
decision (i.e., how much spectrum to purchase/lease from the
spectrum owner) made by a small wireless carrier providing
wireless cellular services, by a mobile virtual network operator
(MVNO) [21] or by an entrant providing cognitive radio access
services [22]. In such scenarios, the long-term “technology
selection” in our model becomes “spectrum acquisition deci-
sion”, whereas the medium-term pricing decision and short-
term user subscription decisions remain unaffected.
IV. FEMTOCELL MARKET WITH NO INCUMBENT
In this section, we study user subscription dynamics and
revenue maximization for the entrant in a femtocell market
with no incumbent. In this scenario, the entrant becomes the
monopolist in the market. In practice, this corresponds to an
emerging market which an entrant tries to explore. We study
first the user subscription dynamics and then the problem of
revenue maximization, based on which the entrant can finally
select its technology with which its profit is maximized.
A. User Subscription Dynamics
When the entrant NSP S2 operates in a market with no
incumbent, each user has a choice of whether to subscribe to
NSP S2 or not at each time instant. Since the QoS provided
NSP S2 is varying with the fraction of its subscribers,8 each
8
“Fraction of subscribers” of an NSP is used throughout this paper to mean
the proportion of users in the market that subscribe to this NSP.
6user will form a belief on the QoS of NSP S2 when it makes
a subscription decision. To describe the dynamics of user
subscription, we construct and analyze a dynamic model which
specifies how users form their beliefs and make decisions
based on their beliefs. We consider a discrete-time model with
time periods indexed t = 1, 2, . . .. At each period t, user k
holds a belief on the QoS of NSP S2, denoted by q˜t2,k and the
subscript k denotes the user index, and makes a subscription
decision to maximize its expected utility in the current period.9
Then, user k subscribes to NSP S2 at period t if and only if
αk q˜
t
2,k ≥ p2. As in [4][8], an implicit assumption is that that,
other than the subscription price, there is no cost involved in
subscription decisions (e.g., initiation fees, termination fees,
device prices). We specify that every user expects that the QoS
in the current period is equal to that in the previous period.
That is, we have q˜t2,k = g(λ
t−1
2 ) for t = 1, 2, . . ., where λt2 is
the fraction of subscribers at period t.10
By substituting q˜t2,k = g(λ
t−1
2 ) into αk q˜t2,k ≥ p2, we can
see that user k subscribes to NSP S2 if and only if αk ≥
p2
g(λt−1
2
)
. That is, only those users with a valuation of QoS
greater than or equal to p2
g(λt−1
2
)
will subscribe to NSP S2 at
time t. Thus, the fraction of subscribers of NSP S2 evolves
following a sequence {λt2}∞t=0 in [0, 1] generated by
λt2 = hm(λ
t−1
2 ) , 1− F
(
p2
g(λt−12 )
)
, (3)
for t = 1, 2, . . ., starting from a given initial point λ02 ∈ [0, 1].
Note that the price p2 of NSP S2 is held fixed over time.
Given the user subscription dynamics (3), we are interested in
whether the fraction of subscribers will stabilize in the long
run and, if so, to what value. As a first step, we define an
equilibrium point of the user subscription dynamics.
Definition 1: λ∗2 is an equilibrium point of the user sub-
scription dynamics in the monopoly market of NSP S2 if it
satisfies
hm(λ
∗
2) = λ
∗
2. (4)
Definition 4 implies that once an equilibrium point is
reached, the fraction of subscribers remains the same from
that point on. Thus, equilibrium points are natural candidates
for the long-run fraction of subscribers. The following Propo-
sition, whose proof is deferred to to Appendix A, establishes
the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium point.
Proposition 1. For any non-negative price p2, there exists a
unique equilibrium point of the user subscription dynamics in
the market of NSP S2. 
Although the analysis in this paper applies to a general QoS
function g(λ2), we consider a class of simple QoS functions
defined below in order to obtain a closed-form expression
of the equilibrium point and solve the revenue maximization
problem explicitly.
9An example consistent with our subscription timing is a “Pay-As-You-Go”
plan in which a subscribing user pays a fixed service charge for a period of
time (day, week, or month) and is free to quit its subscription at any time
period, effective from the next time period.
10This model of belief formation is called naive or static expectations in
[23]. A similar dynamic model of belief formation and decision making has
been extensively adopted in the existing literature (see, e.g., [4][8][14]).
Definition 2: The QoS function g(·) is linearly-degrading
if g(λ2) = q¯2 − cλ2 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1], for some q¯2 > 0 and
c ∈ [0, q¯2). In particular, a linearly-degrading QoS function
with c = 0, i.e., g(λ2) = q¯2 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1], is referred to
as a constant QoS function.
Linearly-degrading QoS functions model a variety of appli-
cations including flow control in [13] and capacity sharing
in [15]. More importantly, it can be viewed as an affine
approximation of real QoS functions and we shall see in the
numerical results that the affine approximation is reasonably
close to the actual QoS functions. With a linearly-degrading
QoS function and uniformly distributed valuations of QoS, we
can obtain a simple closed-form expression of the equilibrium
point. Specifically, with g(λ2) = q¯2 − cλ2 for λ2 ∈ [0, 1]
and f(α) = 1/β for α ∈ [0, β], the equilibrium point of the
user subscription dynamics in the market of NSP S2 can be
expressed as a function of p2 as follows:
λ∗2(p2) =
{
q¯2+c−
√
(q¯2−c)2+
4cp2
β
2c , for p2 ∈ [0, βq¯2],
0, for p2 ∈ (βq¯2,∞),
(5)
if c ∈ (0, q¯2), and λ∗2(p2) = max{0, 1− p2/(βq¯2)} if c = 0.
Our equilibrium analysis so far guarantees the existence of
a unique stable point of the user subscription dynamics. How-
ever, it does not discuss whether the unique stable point will
be eventually reached. To answer this question, we turn to the
analysis of the convergence properties of the user subscription
dynamics. The convergence of the user subscription dynamics
is not always guaranteed, especially when the QoS provided
by the monopolist degrades rapidly with respect to the fraction
of subscribers. As a hypothetical example, suppose that only
a small fraction of users subscribe to NSP S2 at period t and
each subscriber obtains a high QoS. In our model of belief
formation, users expect that the QoS will remain high at period
t+1, and thus a large fraction of users subscribe at period t+1,
which will result in a low QoS at period t+1. This in turn will
induce a small fraction of subscribers at period t + 2. When
the QoS is very sensitive to the fraction of subscribers, the
user subscription dynamics may oscillate around or diverge
away from the equilibrium point and thus convergence may
not be obtained. The following theorem provides a sufficient
condition under which the user subscription dynamics always
converges.
Theorem 1. For any non-negative price p2, the user sub-
scription dynamics specified by (3) converges to the unique
equilibrium point starting from any initial point λ02 ∈ [0, 1] if
max
λ2∈[0,1]
{
−g
′(λ2)
g(λ2)
}
<
1
K
, (6)
where K = maxα∈[0,β] f(α)α.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
By applying Theorem 1 to linearly-degrading QoS func-
tions, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. If the QoS function g(·) is linearly-degrading,
i.e., g(λ2) = q¯2 − cλ2 for λ2 ∈ [0, 1], and
c
q¯2
<
1
1 +K
(7)
7where K = maxα∈[0,β] f(α)α, then the user subscription
dynamics converges to the unique equilibrium point starting
from any initial point λ02 ∈ [0, 1]. 
The condition (6) in Theorem 1 is sufficient but not nec-
essary for the convergence of the user subscription dynamics.
In particular, we observe through numerical simulations that
in some cases (e.g., g(λ2) = 1 − 0.9λ2 for λ2 ∈ [0, 1] and
f(α) = 1 for α ∈ [0, 1]) the user subscription dynamics
converges for a wide range of prices although the condition
(6) is violated. Nevertheless, the sufficient condition provides
us with the insight that if QoS degradation is too fast (i.e.,
−Kg′(λ2) is larger than g(λ2) for some λ2 ∈ [0, 1]), the
dynamics may oscillate or diverge. If our analysis is applied to
study the spectrum acquisition decision, a practical implication
of the derived convergence condition (which may also be
mapped into the spectrum requirement) is that the acquired
spectrum should be sufficiently large such that the congestion
does not grow too rapidly when more users subscribe [19].
We set up our basic model by assuming that all the users will
simultaneously make their subscription decisions at the begin-
ning of each decision period, i.e., “simultaneous/synchronous
move”. However, it should be noted that we can generalize the
user subscription dynamics by assuming that only ǫ fraction of
users, where ǫ ∈ (0, 1], change their subscription decisions in
each period. In this generalized scenario, not all the users make
their decisions simultaneously, while only ǫ fraction of users
in the market do. We still assume that all the users that change
their subscription decisions expect that the QoS they receive
in the next time period will be the same as that in the current
time period. This can be viewed as “asynchronous move”,
under which the user subscription dynamics is generated by
λt2 = (1− ǫ)λt−12 + ǫhm(λt−12 ) (8)
for t = 1, 2, . . ., starting from an initial point λ02 ∈ [0, 1]. For
the more general user subscription dynamics in 8, our original
existence and uniqueness analysis is still valid, whereas the
convergence analysis (Theorem 1) is affected and the sufficient
convergence condition is modified as
max
λ2∈[0,1]
{
−g
′(λ2)
g(λ2)
}
<
1
ǫK
. (9)
As the condition (9) is more easily satisfied for a smaller
ǫ, we see that there is a trade-off between the guarantee of
convergence and the speed of convergence. There exist other
dynamics, such as continuous-time dynamics, modeling the
user subscription process and interested readers may refer to
[4] for a detailed analysis.
Next, we discuss the cost involved when users change their
subscription decisions. For simplicity, we assume that the costs
of activating and terminating the subscription are the same,
and we refer to this cost as switching cost denoted by cs,
which includes, but is not limited to, time spent in calling the
customer service, activation fees and early termination fees. By
charging this cost, the NSP creates the effect of user “lock-in”,
which we note may result in multiple equilibrium points and
different convergence behaviors, subject to the initial point.
For instance, in the extreme case in which the cost is so high
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Fig. 3. User subscription dynamics in a market with no incumbent. p2 = 0.4.
For λ2 ∈ [0, 1], g(λ2) = 1.2 − 1.2λ2 (upper) and g(λ2) = 1.2 − 0.4λ2
(lower).
(e.g., greater than βg(0) which is the highest benefit that a
user can possibly gain by subscribing to NSP S2) that no
users would like to change their subscription decisions, every
possible value of λ2 ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium point. In general,
if user k is a subscriber in the time period t, it will continue
the subscription in the next time period t+ 1 if
αkg(λ
t
2)− p2 ≥ −cs. (10)
On the other hand, if user k is not a subscriber in the time
period t, it will choose to subscribe to the NSP in the next
time period t+ 1 if
αkg(λ
t
2)− p2 − cs ≥ 0. (11)
While rigorous analysis of cs is left as our future work, we
show in Fig. 3 the impact of switching cost cs on the users’
subscription decisions. The upper plot indicates that switching
costs may make the user subscription dynamics converge
even though the QoS degrades rapidly such that the user
subscription dynamics does not converge without switching
costs. We explain this point by noting that, with switching
costs, fewer users will change their subscription decisions and
hence the user subscription dynamics converges under milder
conditions. With switching costs imposed, it can also be seen
from Fig. 3 that there may exist multiple equilibria in the
user subscription dynamics and the equilibrium, to which the
user subscription dynamics converges, depends on the initial
point. Since the analysis of the NSP’s pricing decision and
technology selection largely relies on the equilibrium point
of the user subscription dynamics, the existence of multiple
equilibrium points is challenging to deal with and loses math-
ematical tractability. Thus, as in the existing related literature
(e.g., [4][8][15]), the switching cost is not considered in our
paper. Moreover, neglecting the switching cost is particularly
applicable in a setting where handover and service provider
selection in real time are possible.
8B. Revenue Maximization
Building on the equilibrium analysis of the user subscription
dynamics, we are now interested in finding an optimal price
of NSP S2 that maximizes its equilibrium revenue in the
market with no incumbent.11 Note that the optimal revenue is
associated with the technology selected by NSP S2. To keep
the notion succinct, we omit the subscript of Tl in the revenue
and express it as
R2(p2) = p2λ
∗
2(p2), (12)
where λ∗2(p2) is the equilibrium point of the user subscription
dynamics at price p2. It can be shown that λ∗2(0) = 1, λ∗2(·)
is strictly decreasing on [0, βg(0)], and λ∗2(p2) = 0 for all
p2 ≥ βg(0), where β is the maximum valuation of QoS of
all the users. As a result, NSP S2 will gain a positive revenue
only if it sets a price p2 in (0, βg(0)), and thus a revenue-
maximizing price lies in (0, βg(0)). However, it is difficult to
directly obtain an explicit expression of p2 ∈ (0, βg(0)) that
maximizes R2(p2) even when the QoS function is linearly-
degrading and the users’ valuations of QoS are uniformly
distributed, since λ∗2(p2) is a complicated function of p2 as
can be seen in (5). In the following analysis, we reformulate
the revenue maximization problem by applying the marginal
user principle12 [17][18]. Specifically, we change the choice
variable in the revenue maximization problem.
Suppose that a marginal user exists, whose valuation of
QoS is denoted by α. Then from the utility function in (1),
we can see that all the users with valuations of QoS greater
than α receive a positive utility and thus subscribe to NSP
S2 [2][17]. Hence, when a marginal user has a valuation
of QoS α ∈ [0, β], the fraction of subscribers is given by
λ2 = 1− F (α). Also, for a given price p2 ∈ [0, βg(0)], there
exists a unique valuation of QoS of a marginal user α ∈ [0, β],
and the relationship between p2 and α is given by
p2 = αg(1− F (α)). (13)
Based on the above relationships between p2, α, and λ2,
we can formulate the revenue maximization problem using
different choice variables as follows:
max
p2∈[0,βg(0)]
p2λ
∗
2(p2) = max
α∈[0,β]
αg(1− F (α)) [1− F (α)]
= max
λ2∈[0,1]
F−1(1− λ2)g(λ2)λ2,
(14)
where F−1(·) is the inverse function of F (·) defined on
[0, 1].13 It is clear that a solution to each of the above three
problems exists, since the constraint set is compact and the
objective function is continuous. Let p∗, α∗, and λ∗∗2 be a
solution to each respective problem in (14). By imposing an
assumption on the distribution of the users’ valuations of QoS,
11By focusing on equilibrium revenue, we implicitly assume that the unique
equilibrium point is reached within a relatively short period of time.
12In the market with no incumbent, marginal users are users that are
indifferent between subscribing and not subscribing to NSP S2 given the
received QoS and the charged price. In our model, a marginal user receives
zero utility.
13We define F−1(0) = 0 and F−1(1) = β.
we obtain upper and lower bounds on p∗, α∗, and λ∗∗2 in
Proposition 2, whose proof is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 2. Suppose that f(·) is non-increasing on [0, β].
Then optimal variables solving the revenue maximization
problem in (14) satisfy F−1(1/2)g(1/2) ≤ p∗2 < βg(0),
F−1(1/2) ≤ α∗ < β, and 0 < λ∗∗2 ≤ 1/2. 
The non-increasing property of f(·) can be considered as
representing a class of emerging markets where there are
fewer users with higher valuations of QoS provided by the
NSP [27]. Proposition 2 shows that when the monopolist
maximizes its revenue in an emerging market, no more than a
half of the users, only those whose valuations are sufficiently
high, are served. In other words, in an emerging market, the
NSP will serve a minority of users with high valuations to
maximize its revenue. Since a uniform distribution satisfies
the non-increasing property, applying Proposition 2 to the
case of a uniform distribution of the users’ valuations of QoS
(i.e., f(α) = 1/β and F (α) = α/β for α ∈ [0, β]) yields
(β/2)g(1/2) ≤ p∗2 < βg(0) and β/2 ≤ α∗ < β. If, in
addition, the QoS function satisfies the sufficient condition
(6) for convergence, we obtain tighter bounds on optimal
variables.
Corollary 2. Suppose that f(α) = 1/β for α ∈ [0, β]
and −g′(λ2)/g(λ2) < 1 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then optimal
variables solving the revenue maximization problem in (14)
satisfy (β/2)g(1/2) ≤ p∗2 < [(
√
5 − 1)/2]βg((3 − √5)/2),
β/2 ≤ α∗ < [(√5− 1)/2]β, and (3 −√5)/2 < λ∗∗2 ≤ 1/2.
Proof: The proof is omitted due to space limitations. 
With a uniform distribution of the users’ valuations of QoS
and a linearly-degrading QoS function, we can obtain explicit
expressions of optimal variables of the revenue maximization
problem as follows:
α∗ =
2c− q¯2 +
√
q¯22 + c
2 − cq¯2
3c
β, (15)
λ∗∗2 =
c+ q¯2 −
√
q¯22 + c
2 − cq¯2
3c
, (16)
and p∗2 = α∗(q¯2 − cλ∗∗2 ). The high-level insight from this
result is that the optimal price maximizing the NSP’s revenue
should be decreased if the QoS degrades more quickly and
that the optimal market share is independent of the interval
on which the users’ valuation of QoS is uniformly distributed.
Moreover, the result quantifies the impacts of the QoS function
(i.e., maximum QoS and degrading rate) as well as the users’
valuation of QoS on the optimal price. For instance, as shown
in Fig. 5(a), the NSP does not incur a significant revenue loss
if its equilibrium market share is around one half, whereas its
revenue loss is nearly 10% and more if its equilibrium market
share is less than 0.4 or greater than 0.6. This indicates that
the NSP’s revenue is near to its optimum if the NSP serves
around one half of the market, while both under-serving and
over-serving will significantly reduce the NSP’s revenue. Due
to the implicit and explicit coupling involved in our considered
three-decision making process, it is difficult to see how the
quantitative results in the pricing decision stage directly affects
the entrant’s long-term technology selection. Nevertheless,
9solving the revenue maximization problem (i.e., medium-term
problem) explicitly serves as a basis for the entrant to decide
whether or not to enter the market and select the technology
that maximizes its long-term profit (i.e., long-term problem).
Finally, we note that in order to maximize its equilibrium
revenue, the entrant needs to know the distribution of the
users’ valuations of QoS by conducting market surveys and
using data-mining and learning techniques. The details of
information acquisition are beyond the scope of this paper.
V. FEMTOCELL MARKET WITH ONE INCUMBENT
In this section, we analyze user subscription dynamics and
market competition for the entrant in a femtocel market with
one incumbent. In other words, the two NSPs operate and
compete against each other in a duopoly market.
A. User Subscription Dynamics
With the two NSPs operating in the market, each user
has three possible choices at each time instant: subscribe to
NSP S1, subscribe to NSP S2, and subscribe to neither. As
in the market with no incumbent, we consider a dynamic
model in which the users update their beliefs and make
subscription decisions at discrete time period t = 1, 2, . . ..
The users expect that the QoS provided by NSP S2 in the
current period is equal to that in the previous period and
make their subscription decisions to maximize their expected
utility in the current period [8]. We assume that, other than
the subscription price, there is no cost involved in subscription
decisions (e.g., initiation fees, termination fees) when users
switch between NSP S1 and NSP S2 [4]. By Assumption 2,
at period t = 1, 2 · · · , user k subscribes to NSP S1 if and only
if
αkq1 − p1 ≥ αkg(λt−12 )− p2 and αkq1 − p1 ≥ 0, (17)
to NSP S2 if and only if
αkg(λ
t−1
2 )− p2 > αkq1 − p1 and αkg(λt−12 )− p2 ≥ 0, (18)
and to neither NSP if and only if
αkq1 − p1 < 0 and αkg(λt−12 )− p2 < 0. (19)
By solving (17)–(19), it can be shown that, given the prices
(p1, p2), the user subscription dynamics is described by a se-
quence {(λt1, λt2)}∞t=0 in Λ = {(λ1, λ2) ∈ R2+ | λ1 + λ2 ≤ 1}
generated by
λt1 = hd,1(λ
t−1
1 , λ
t−1
2 ) , 1− F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λt−12 )
)
, (20)
λt2 = hd,2(λ
t−1
1 , λ
t−1
2 ) , F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λt−12 )
)
− F
(
p2
g(λt−12 )
)
(21)
if p1/q1 > p2/g(λt−12 ), and by
λt1 = hd,1(λ
t−1
1 , λ
t−1
2 ) , 1− F
(
p1
q1
)
, (22)
λt2 = hd,2(λ
t−1
1 , λ
t−1
2 ) , 0 (23)
if p1/q1 ≤ p2/g(λt−12 ), for t = 1, 2, . . ., starting from a given
initial point (λ01, λ02). Note that there are two regimes of the
user subscription dynamics, and which regime governs the
dynamics depends on the relative values of the prices per QoS,
i.e., p1/q1 and p2/g(λt−12 ). Specifically, if the price per QoS
offered by NSP S1 is higher than that offered by NSP S2 (i.e.,
p1/q1 > p2/g(λ
t−1
2 )), then users who are sensitive to prices
(i.e., those whose valuations are not sufficiently high and lie
between p1−p2
q1−g(λ
t−1
2
)
and p2
g(λt−1
2
)
) will prefer NSP S2 to NSP
S1.
We give the definition of an equilibrium point, which is
similar to Definition 1.
Definition 3: (λ∗1, λ∗2) is an equilibrium point of the user
subscription dynamics in duopoly the market of NSP S1 and
S2 if it satisfies
hd,1(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2) = λ
∗
1 and hd,2(λ∗1, λ∗2) = λ∗2. (24)
We establish the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
point and provide equations characterizing it in Proposition 3,
whose proof is deferred to Appendix D.
Proposition 3. For any non-negative price pair (p1, p2),
there exists a unique equilibrium point (λ∗1, λ∗2) of the user
subscription dynamics in the market with one incumbent.
Moreover, (λ∗1, λ∗2) satisfies

λ∗1 = 1− F
(
p1
q1
)
, λ∗2 = 0, if
p1
q1
≤ p2
g(0)
,
λ∗1 = 1− F (θ∗1) , λ∗2 = F (θ∗1)− F (θ∗2) , if
p1
q1
>
p2
g(0)
,
(25)
where θ∗1 = (p1 − p2)/(q1 − g(λ∗2)) and θ∗2 = p2/g(λ∗2). 
Proposition 3 indicates that, given any prices (p1, p2), the
market shares of the two NSPs are uniquely determined when
the fraction of users subscribing to each NSP no longer
changes. Theoretically, this result ensures that if the NSPs
choose the optimal price (and also the entrant NSP selects
the optimal technology), then their corresponding profits will
be maximized, since the resulting outcome (e.g., equilibrium)
is unique and the NSPs face no uncertainty in the user
subscription dynamics. Proposition 3 also shows that the
structure of the equilibrium point depends on the relative
values of p1/q1 and p2/g(0). Specifically, if the price per
QoS of NSP S1 is always lower than or equal to that of
NSP S2, i.e., p1/q1 ≤ p2/g(0), then no users subscribe to
NSP S2 at the equilibrium point. On the other hand, if NSP
S2 offers a lower price per QoS to its first subscriber than
NSP S1 does, i.e., p1/q1 > p2/g(0), then both NSP S1 and
NSP S2 may attract a positive fraction of subscribers. This
result regarding the price per QoS quantifies the necessary
condition on prices that the entrant NSP should set such that
it can receive a positive revenue. We note that, although it
may be familiar to researchers and/or managers, this result
is important and relevant for the completeness of study, as
it rigorously characterizes the equilibrium outcome in the
user subscription dynamics and serves as the basis for both
NSPs to make pricing decisions and for the entrant to make
technology decisions. The importance of Proposition 3 can
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also be reflected in recent works (e.g., [4][8][15][2]) which
establish similar results under various settings.
We now investigate whether the user subscription dynamics
specified by (20)–(23) stabilizes as time passes. As in the
market with no incumbent, the considered user subscription
dynamics is guaranteed to converge to the unique equilibrium
when the QoS degradation of NSP S2 is not too fast. In
the following theorem, we provide a sufficient condition for
convergence.
Theorem 2. For any non-negative price pair (p1, p2), the
user subscription dynamics specified by (20)–(23) converges
to the unique equilibrium point starting from any initial point
(λ01, λ
0
2) ∈ Λ if
max
λ2∈[0,1]
{
−g
′(λ2)
g(λ2)
· q1
q1 − g(λ2)
}
<
1
K
, (26)
where K = maxα∈[0,β] f(α)α.
Proof: See Appendix E. 
Note that the condition (26) imposes a more stringent
requirement on the QoS function g(·) than the condition (6)
does, since q1/(q1 − g(λ2)) > 1 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. However,
the condition (26) provides us with a similar insight that, if
QoS degradation is severe, the user subscription dynamics may
exhibit oscillation or divergence.
B. Revenue Maximization
We now study revenue maximization in the market with one
incumbent. In the economics literature, competition among
a small number of firms has been analyzed using game
theory, following largely two distinct approaches: Bertrand
competition and Cournot competition [25]. In Bertrand com-
petition, firms choose prices independently while supplying
quantities demanded at the chosen prices. On the other hand,
in Cournot competition, firms choose quantities independently
while prices are determined in the markets to equate demand
with the chosen quantities. In the case of monopoly, whether
the monopolist chooses the price or the quantity does not
affect the outcome since there is a one-to-one relationship
between the price and the quantity given a downward-sloping
demand function. This point was illustrated with our model
in Section IV-B. On the contrary, in the presence of strategic
interaction, whether firms choose prices or quantities can affect
the outcome significantly. For example, it is well-known that
identical firms producing a homogeneous good obtain zero
profit in the equilibrium of Bertrand competition while they
obtain a positive profit in the equilibrium of Cournot compe-
tition, if they have a constant marginal cost of production and
face a linear demand function.
We first consider Bertrand competition between the two
NSPs. Let λ∗i (p1, p2) be the market share of NSP Si, for
i = 1, 2, at the unique equilibrium point of the considered user
subscription dynamics given a price pair (p1, p2). λ∗i (·) can be
interpreted as a demand function of NSP Si, and the revenue
of NSP Si at the equilibrium point can be expressed as14
14Without causing ambiguity, in the following analysis, we also express the
revenue of an NSP as a function of the fraction of subscribers.
Ri(p1, p2) = piλ
∗
i (p1, p2), for i = 1, 2. Bertrand competition
in the market can be formulated as a non-cooperative game
specified by
GB = {Si, Ri(p1, p2), pi ∈ R+ | i = 1, 2} . (27)
A price pair (p∗1, p∗2) is said to be a (pure) NE of GB (or a
Bertrand equilibrium) if it satisfies
Ri(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i) ≥ Ri(pi, p∗−i), ∀ pi ∈ R+, ∀ i = 1, 2 . (28)
It can be shown that, if a Bertrand equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2) exists,
it must satisfy
0 <
p∗2
g(0)
<
p∗1
q1
< β (29)
and λ∗i (p∗1, p∗2) ∈ (0, 1) so that Ri(p∗1, p∗2) > 0, for i = 1, 2.
However, since the functions λ∗i (p1, p2), i = 1, 2, are defined
implicitly by (25), it is difficult to provide a primitive condition
on g(·) that guarantees the existence of a Bertrand equilibrium.
We now consider Cournot competition between the two
NSPs. Let λi ∈ [0, 1] be the market share chosen by NSP
Si, for i = 1, 2. Suppose that λ1 + λ2 ≤ 1 so that the
chosen market shares are feasible. Let pi(λ1, λ2), i = 1, 2,
be the prices that clear the market, i.e., the prices that satisfy
λi = λ
∗
i (p1(λ1, λ2), p2(λ1, λ2)) for i = 1, 2. Note first that,
given a price pair (p1, p2), if a user k subscribes to NSP S1,
i.e., αkq1 − p1 ≥ αkg(λ2) − p2 and αkq1 − p1 ≥ 0, then
all the users whose valuations of QoS are larger than αk also
subscribe to NSP S1. Also, if a user k subscribes to one of
the NSPs, i.e., max{αkq1 − p1, αkg(λ2) − p2} ≥ 0, then all
the users whose valuations of QoS are larger than αk also
subscribe to one of the NSPs. Therefore, realizing positive
market shares λ1, λ2 > 0 requires two types of marginal users
whose valuations of QoS are specified by αm,1 and αm,2 with
αm,1 > αm,2. αm,1 is the valuation of QoS of a marginal user
that is indifferent between subscribing to NSP S1 and NSP S2,
while αm,2 is the valuation of QoS of a marginal user that is
indifferent between subscribing to NSP S2 and neither. The
expressions for αm,1 and αm,2 that realize (λ1, λ2) such that
λ1, λ2 > 0 and λ1 + λ2 ≤ 1 are given by
αm,1(λ1, λ2) = z1(λ1) , F
−1(1 − λ1), (30)
αm,2(λ1, λ2) = z2(λ1, λ2) , F
−1(1− λ1 − λ2). (31)
Also, by solving the indifference conditions, αm,1q1 − p1 =
αm,1g(λ2)− p2 and αm,2g(λ2)− p2 = 0, we obtain a unique
price pair that realizes (λ1, λ2) such that λ1, λ2 > 0 and λ1+
λ2 ≤ 1,
p1(λ1, λ2) =F
−1(1− λ1) [q1 − g(λ2)]
+ F−1(1− λ1 − λ2)g(λ2), (32)
p2(λ1, λ2) =F
−1(1− λ1 − λ2)g(λ2). (33)
Note that the expressions (30)–(33) are still valid even when
λi = 0 for some i = 1, 2, although uniqueness is no longer
obtained. Hence, we can interpret pi(·), i = 1, 2, as a function
defined on Λ = {(λ1, λ2) ∈ R2+ | λ1 + λ2 ≤ 1}, i.e.,
an inverse demand function in economics terminology. Then
the revenue of Si when the NSPs choose (λ1, λ2) ∈ Λ is
given by Ri(λ1, λ2) = λipi(λ1, λ2), for i = 1, 2. We define
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Ri(λ1, λ2) = 0, i = 1, 2, if λ1 + λ2 > 1, i.e., if the market
shares chosen by the NSPs are infeasible. Cournot competition
in the market can be formulated as a non-cooperative game
specified by
GC = {Si, Ri(λ1, λ2), λi ∈ [0, 1] | i = 1, 2} . (34)
A market share pair (λ∗∗1 , λ∗∗2 ) is said to be a (pure) NE of
GC (or a Cournot equilibrium) if it satisfies
Ri(λ
∗∗
i , λ
∗∗
−i) ≥ Ri(λi, λ∗∗−i), ∀ λi ∈ [0, 1], ∀ i = 1, 2 . (35)
Note that (1, 1) is a NE of GC , which yields zero profit to
both NSPs. To eliminate this inefficient and counterintuitive
equilibrium, we restrict the strategy space of each NSP to
[0, 1). Deleting 1 from the strategy space can also be justified
by noting that λi = 1 is a weakly dominated strategy for NSP
Si, for i = 1, 2, since Ri(1, λ−i) = 0 ≤ Ri(λi, λ−i) for all
(λi, λ−i) ∈ [0, 1]2.15 We use G˜C to represent the Cournot
competition game with the restricted strategy space [0, 1).
The following lemma bounds the market shares that solve the
revenue maximization problem of each NSP, when the PDF
of the users’ valuations of QoS satisfies the non-increasing
property as in Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. Suppose that f(·) is non-increasing on [0, β]. Let
λ˜i(λ−i) be a market share that maximizes the revenue of NSP
Si provided that NSP S−i chooses λ−i ∈ [0, 1), i.e., λ˜i(λ−i) ∈
argmaxλi∈[0,1)Ri(λi, λ−i). Then λ˜i(λ−i) ∈ (0, 1/2] for all
λ−i ∈ [0, 1), for all i = 1, 2. Moreover, λ˜i(λ−i) 6= 1/2 if
λ−i > 0, for i = 1, 2.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and
omitted for brevity. 
Lemma 1 implies that, when the strategy space is specified
as [0, 1) and f(·) satisfies the non-increasing property, strate-
gies λi ∈ {0} ∪ (1/2, 1) is strictly dominated for i = 1, 2.
Hence, if a NE (λ∗∗1 , λ∗∗2 ) of G˜C exists, then it must satisfy
(λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 ) ∈ (0, 1/2)2, which yields positive revenues for both
NSPs. Furthermore, since a revenue-maximizing NSP never
uses a strictly dominated strategy, the set of NE of G˜C is not
affected by restricting the strategy space to [0, 1/2]. Based on
the discussion so far, we can provide a sufficient condition on
f(·) and g(·) that guarantees the existence of a NE of G˜C .
Theorem 3. Suppose that f(·) is non-increasing and con-
tinuously differentiable on [0, β].16 If f(·) and g(·) satisfy
(36) and (37) (shown on the top of the next page), for all
(λ1, λ2) ∈ [0, 1/2]2, then the game G˜C has at least one NE.
Proof: See Appendix F. 
We briefly discuss the conditions (36) and (37) in Theorem 3
as follows. Under these conditions, one NSP lowers its market
share to maximize its revenue when the other NSP increases
its market share. In other words, if we treat −λ1 as the action
of NSP S1, then the game becomes a supermodular game and
exhibits a strategic complementarity, i.e., the NSPs’ strategies
15λi ∈ [0, 1] is a weakly (strictly) dominated strategy for NSP Si in GC
(G˜C ) if there exists another strategy λ′i ∈ [0, 1] such that Ri(λi, λ−i) ≤
Ri(λ′i, λ−i) (Ri(λi, λ−i) < Ri(λ′i, λ−i)) for all λ−i ∈ [0, 1].
16We define the derivative of f(·) at 0 and β using a one-sided limit as in
footnote 3.
are compliments to each other [26]. Due to the general
distribution of the users’ valuations of QoS, it is difficult to
characterize QoS functions satisfying the conditions (36) and
(37). Nevertheless, if we focus on the uniform distribution
of the users’ valuations of QoS, the conditions (36) and (37)
coincide and reduce to g(λ2) + λ2g′(λ2) ≥ 0, and thus we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the users’ valuations of QoS are
uniformly distributed, i.e., f(α) = 1/β for α ∈ [0, β]. If
g(λ2) + λ2g
′(λ2) ≥ 0 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1/2], then the game
G˜C has at least one NE. 
Corollary 3 states that if the elasticity of the QoS provided
by NSP S2 with respect to the fraction of its subscribers is
no larger than 1 (i.e., −[g′(λ2)λ2/g(λ2)] ≤ 1), the Cournot
competition game with the strategy space [0, 1) has at least
one NE. Note that the condition (6) in Theorem 1 can be
rewritten as g(λ2) + Kg′(λ2) > 0 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1], where
K = maxα∈[0,β] f(α)α. Thus, the condition in Corollary 3
is analogous to the sufficient conditions for convergence in
that it requires that the QoS provided by NSP S2 cannot
degrade too fast with respect to the fraction of subscribers.
We explain this point by considering a hypothetical scenario
as follows. If NSP S1 increases its action −λ1 (i.e., lowers
its market share) and the QoS provided by NSP S2 degrades
very rapidly when more users subscribe, then NSP S2 does not
necessarily want to increase its market share to maximize its
revenue. This is because if NSP S2 increases its market share,
then its QoS may be very low due to the severe degradation.
Correspondingly, NSP S2 has to charge a very low price to
maintain the increased market share and hence, its revenue
may not be maximized. Thus, strategic complementarity does
not necessarily hold and an NE may not necessarily exist.
With a linearly-degrading QoS function g(λ2) = q¯2− cλ2, we
can obtain explicit expressions of the NSPs’ best responses as
follows:
B1(λ2) = q1 − λ2(q¯2 − cλ2)
2q1
, (38)
B2(λ1) = c(1 − λ1) + q¯2 −
√
q¯22 + c
2(1− λ1)2 − cq¯2(1− λ1)
3c
.
(39)
Moreover, we have the following corollary regarding the NE
of the game G˜C .
Corollary 4. If the users’ valuations of QoS are uniformly
distributed, i.e., f(α) = 1/β for α ∈ [0, β], and the QoS
function g(·) is linearly-degrading, i.e., g(λ2) = q¯2 − cλ2 for
λ2 ∈ [0, 1], then the game G˜C has a unique NE, which can be
reached through the best response dynamics specified in (38)
and (39).
Proof: By plugging g(λ2) = q¯2 − cλ2 into the condition
g(λ2) + λ2g
′(λ2) ≥ 0, for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1/2], in Corollary
3, we see that q¯2 − 2cλ2 ≥ 0, for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1/2], since
c < q¯2. Hence, the existence of NE is proved. The uniqueness
of NE can be proved by solving the NE condition and checking
that only one point (λ∗∗1 , λ∗∗2 ) satisfies λ∗∗1 ∈ [0, 1/2] and
λ∗∗2 ∈ [0, 1/2]. Since the condition in Corollary 3 is satisfied,
if we treat −λ1 as the action of NSP S1, then the game is
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{
1
f(F−1(1− λ1 − λ2)) +
λ1f
′(F−1(1− λ1 − λ2))
[f(F−1(1− λ1 − λ2))]3
}
g(λ2)
+
{
F−1(1− λ1)− λ1
f(F−1(1− λ1)) − F
−1(1− λ1 − λ2) + λ1
f(F−1(1 − λ1 − λ2))
}
g′(λ2) ≥ 0 (36)
{
1
f(F−1(1− λ1 − λ2)) +
λ2f
′(F−1(1− λ1 − λ2))
[f(F−1(1 − λ1 − λ2))]3
}
g(λ2) +
λ2
f(F−1(1 − λ1 − λ2))g
′(λ2) ≥ 0 (37)
a supermodular game with a unique NE, to which the best
response dynamics always converges [26]. Thus, in the game
G˜C , the best response dynamics also converges to the NE. The
details are omitted for brevity. 
If the NSPs do not have complete information regarding
the market (e.g., an NSP does not know how its competitor
responds to its price and market share change in the future),
then an NE may not necessarily be achieved directly and thus,
we briefly discuss an iterative process to reach a NE of the
Cournot competition game. Theorem 3 is based on the fact
that the Cournot competition game with the strategy space
[0, 1/2] can be transformed to a supermodular game [26] when
(36) and (37) are satisfied. It is known that the largest and
the smallest NE of a supermodular game can be obtained
by iterated strict dominance, which uses the best response. A
detailed analysis of this process requires an explicit expression
of the best response correspondence of each NSP, which is not
readily available without specific assumptions on f(·) and g(·).
If the users’ valuations of QoS are uniformly distributed and
the QoS function g(·) is linearly-degrading, then the NSPs S1
and S2 can adopt the best responses given in (38) and (39),
respectively, until the unique NE is reached. As illustrated
in Fig. 1, there are three levels of time horizons. In the
short-term horizon, users make subscription decisions, whereas
in the medium-term horizon, the NSPs adjust their market
shares based on the best responses specified in (38) and (39).
The long-term horizon is the life-span of technologies. These
different time horizons reflect that the NSPs do not change
their prices (determined by their desired market shares) as
often as the users change their subscription decisions, while
the NSPs change their prices more frequently than they make
entry and technology selection decisions. We assume that the
medium-term horizon is sufficiently longer than the short-term
horizon such that once the NSPs choose their prices (or desired
market shares), the equilibrium market shares are quickly
reached by the users. At the same time, we assume that the
long-term horizon is sufficiently longer than the medium-term
horizon such that that the NSPs have enough time to reach
the NE of the game given their technologies. In this sense,
the best response dynamics is a reasonable approach to reach
the NE, when the NSPs do not have sufficient information
to compute NE and thus cannot play it directly. Moreover,
for multi-stage decision making (i.e., leader-follower model)
considered in our study, it is common that decision makers
adopt best response dynamics to reach an equilibrium given
the decisions made by their “leaders”. For instance, a two-
stage decision making process was studied in [3], where the
authors neglected the user subscription dynamics and derived
the best-response prices for Internet service providers.
VI. ENTRY AND TECHNOLOGY SELECTION
In the previous two sections, we have studied the user
subscription dynamics and revenue maximization for mar-
kets with no incumbents and with one incumbent. In this
section, we formalize the problem of entry and technology
selection as follows. Denote the set of available options by
{T0, T1, T2 · · · TL}, where T0 = “Not Enter” represents that
the entrant chooses not to enter the market.
We assume that the entrant knows the (expected) life-span of
technologies, and kl ≥ 0 is the average cost per period over the
life-span associated with the technology Tl, for l = 1, 2 · · ·L,
i.e., total cost divided by the number of periods in the life-
span. Typically, the life-span of technologies is sufficiently
long compared to a short-term period of user subscriptions,
and hence the maximum average revenue per period is ap-
proximately equal to the maximum per-period revenue at the
equilibrium (i.e., the revenue obtained during the first few
periods, e.g., time required for the user subscription dynamics
to converge, can be ignored) [3]. For the convenience of
analysis, kl is assumed to be independent of the fraction of
subscribers served by the entrant, once the technology Tl is
selected and deployed. Thus, the long-term profit during each
period is R∗2,l − kl, where R∗2,l is the per-period revenue
obtained by solving (14) for the market with no incumbent and
the per-period revenue at the Nash equilibrium for the market
with one incumbent. The subscript l stresses that the revenue
is associated with the technology Tl selected by the entrant,
for l = 1, 2 · · ·L. Note that if T0 = “Not Enter” is selected,
then the associated cost k0 = 0 and the corresponding revenue
is zero. Mathematically, the entry and technology selection
problem can be stated as
max
Tl∈{T0,T1,T2···TL}
(
R∗2,l − kl
)
, (40)
which can be solved by enumerating all the available options
{T0, T1, T2 · · · TL}. For the market with no incumbent, if the
users’ valuations of QoS are uniformly distributed and the
QoS is linearly-degrading, then the optimal revenue can be
expressed in a closed form and hence, the entry and technology
selection problem can be explicitly solved based on (40).
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to complement
the analysis. For simplicity, we focus on two spectrum sharing
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TABLE I
NETWORK PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Broadband factor
Incumbent: 2
Entrant (split): 1.90
Entrant (common): 1.85
Activity ratio 0.8
Macrocell capacity 0.5
Degradation coefficient 0.4
Fraction outside 0.3
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1.4
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1.5
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1.65
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q1 q2 (split)
q2 (common)
Fig. 4. QoS function (with a unit of “bit/sec”) and approximation. The
actual and approximated QoS functions are plotted in markers and solid lines,
respectively. Approximated QoS functions: q1 = 1.687, q2 = g(λ2) =
1.633− 0.088λ2 (split), q2 = g(λ2) = 1.611 − 0.129λ2 (common).
schemes, namely, “split” and ‘’common”, which are available
for the entrant. Mathematically, the set of available options
for the entrant can be denoted by {T0 = “Not Enter”, T1 =
“Split”, T2 = “Common”}. Since we mainly focus on the
entry and technology selection for the entrant, we assume
as an example that the incumbent uses the “split” spectrum
sharing scheme for its femtocells and macrocells. Note that
we can carry out a similar analysis while assuming that the
incumbent operates under the “common” spectrum sharing
scheme, although the specific results of entry and technology
selection for the entrant may be different. We also assume that
the incumbent has three times the bandwidth as the entrant,
which reflects the fact that the incumbent has more resources
than the entrant, and that the users’ valuations of QoS are
uniformly distributed in [0, 1], i.e., f(α) = 1 for α ∈ [0, 1].
Although our analysis applies to any QoS metric and QoS
function satisfying Assumption 1, we shall explicitly consider
“average (normalized) throughput”, which has a unit of bit/sec
and measures the average transmission rate offered by the
NSPs. In a femtocell market, if a user subscribes to either of
the two NSPs, it can use femtocell at home and macrocell base
stations while staying outdoors. Hence, to derive the average
throughput, both the users’ outdoor and indoor accesses need
to be considered [2] and the average throughput can be
expressed as
E(Tf ) = (1− fo) · E(Tb) + fo · E(Tm), (41)
where fo the fraction of time that users spend outdoors, Tb is
the throughput obtained by a user from his broadband connec-
tion via the femtocell, and Tm is the throughput obtained via
macrocells. By considering the users’ time-varying positions,
transmitted data sizes, and network congestions, the authors
in [2] derived an explicit expression of (41) which, due to its
complexity, is not shown here. In Table I, we show the network
parameters, the meaning of which can be found in [2]. We
compute the NSPs’ QoS functions based on (41) derived in
[2] and plot them in Fig. 4. Using minimum mean square error
fitting, we approximate the QoS provided by NSP S1 using a
constant and the QoS provided by NSP S2 using an affine
function (i.e., linearly-degrading QoS).17 The approximated
QoS functions are shown as solid lines in Fig. 4. We see
from Fig. 4 that although the QoS function of NSP S1 is also
decreasing in the number of subscribers, its slope is much
less than that of NSP S2’s QoS function and approximating
it using a constant still stays close to the actual QoS (within
2%). It is also observed from Fig. 4 that the QoS provided
by NSP S2 satisfies the property of non-increasing in the
number of subscribers. While approximating the QoS using
an affine function when NSP S2 uses the “split” spectrum
sharing scheme is fairly accurate, the affine approximation
is not close to the actual QoS if the “common” spectrum
sharing scheme is used. Nevertheless, it can be seen from
Fig. 5(a) that the revenue obtained for the (approximated)
linearly-degrading QoS function is very close to that obtained
for the actual QoS function (within 1%).18 Then, by using the
marginal user principle, the optimal prices obtained based on
the approximated linearly-degrading and actual QoS functions
are 0.837 and 0.839, respectively, which are very close to
each other (within 1%). Thus, approximating the QoS function
using an affine function is sufficiently accurate for the purpose
of maximizing the revenue, and our previous analysis based
on linearly-degrading QoS functions can be applied without
losing much accuracy.
A. With no incumbent
We first consider a market with no incumbent. Fig. 5(b)
illustrates the convergence of the user subscription dynamics
for a particular price p2 = 1.2, when the entrant uses the
split spectrum sharing technology. Note that given any price
p2 ≥ 0, convergence will always be obtained, since the QoS
function satisfies the sufficient condition for convergence given
in Theorem 1. Note that convergence can also be observed
if the entrant uses the common spectrum sharing technology,
which is not shown in the paper for brevity. Fig. 5(c) verifies
Proposition 2 that the optimal market share maximizing the
revenue of NSP S2 is upper bounded by 1/2. We also observe
from Fig. 5(c) that the split spectrum sharing technology can
yield a higher revenue for NSP S2, since it provides a higher
QoS, compared to the common spectrum sharing technology.
17Note that our analysis does not require the QoS function of NSP S2 to
be linearly-degrading that the affine approximation is applied mainly because
it allows us to derive more specific analytical results.
18Note that, for the incumbent and for the entrant using a split spectrum
sharing scheme, the revenues obtained based on approximated QoS functions
are also very close to those obtained based on the actual QoS functions,
although they are not shown in Fig. 5(a).
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(b) Convergence of the user subscription dynamics
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1.633 − 0.088λ2 (split).
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Fig. 5. Market with no incumbent.
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Fig. 6. Technology selection for different costs. Top: with no incumbent;
bottom: with one incumbent.
Nevertheless, to select the technology that maximizes the
entrant’s long-term profit, it also needs to take into account
the cost associated with the employed technology (such as de-
veloping and implementing spectrum sharing protocol stacks,
build base stations that complies with employed technology,
etc.). We illustrate in the upper plot of Fig. 6 the technology
selection made by the entrant for different costs k1 and k2. It
shows that, even though the split spectrum sharing technology
(“split”) offers a higher QoS than the common spectrum
sharing technology (“common”) at any number of subscribers,
the entrant may still select the “common” technology if the
associated cost is sufficiently lower than that associated with
the “split” technology. This result quantifies the condition
under which the entrant should select “split” or “common”,
and serves as a quantitative guidance for the entrant to choose
a spectrum sharing technology and maximize its profit.
B. With one incumbent
Now, we provide some numerical results regarding the
market share competition game. The QoS functions we use
in the numerical results are approximate affine functions,
rather than the actual QoS functions. Note, however, that
we can obtain almost the same results if we use the actual
QoS functions, since the affine approximation is sufficiently
accurate for analyzing the revenue. The convergence of the
considered user subscription dynamics is similar with that
in the market with no incumbent, and hence it is omitted
due to the space limitations. Starting from different initial
points, Figs. 7(a), 7(b), and 7(c) show the convergence of
market shares, prices, and revenues, respectively, when both
NSPs S1 and S2 update their market shares by choosing their
best responses to the market share of the other NSP in the
previous period. Since the considered QoS functions satisfy the
conditions in Corollary 4, the Cournot competition game with
the strategy space [0, 1/2] has a unique NE, as verified in Fig.
7(a). Moreover, Fig. 7(a) is consistent with Lemma 1 as the
best-response market shares of both NSPs do not exceed 1/2.
It can also be observed from Figs. 7(a) and 7(c) that if NSP S2
uses the common spectrum sharing technology that provides
a lower QoS (shown in solid lines) compared to that provided
by the split spectrum sharing technology (shown in dashed
lines), it obtains a smaller revenue, while NSP S1 obtains a
higher revenue. This is because when NSP S2 has a lower QoS,
it tries to maintain its market share by lowering its price to
compensate for the lower QoS, as can be seen from Fig. 7(b).
By comparing the entrant’s technology selection in a market
with no and one incumbent (shown in Fig. 6), we notice that
competition from the incumbent sets a barrier for the entrant to
enter the market. That is, the presence of an incumbent lowers
the cost threshold under which the entrant earns positive profit
from entering the market. Moreover, our analysis provides the
entrant with a quantitative guideline as to whether to enter a
communications market and which technology to select such
that it can maximize its long-term profit.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Focusing on a femtocell market, we studied in this paper the
problem of long-term entry and spectrum sharing scheme deci-
sion for an entrant. To address the long-term decision, we also
studied two related problems: the entrant’s medium-term pric-
ing decisions and the users’ short-term subscription decisions.
We considered two scenarios, one with no incumbent and the
15
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
t
(λ 1
,
λ 2
)
 
 
λ1
λ2
(a) Convergence of market shares under the best-
response dynamics.
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
t
(p 1
,
p 2
)
 
 
p1
p2
(b) Convergence of prices under the best-response
dynamics.
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
t
(R
1,
R
2)
 
 
R1
R2
(c) Convergence of revenues under the best-
response dynamics.
Fig. 7. Market with one incumbent. Dashed and solid lines represent that the entrant uses the split and common spectrum sharing technologies, respectively.
other with one incumbent. In each scenario, we constructed
the user subscription dynamics based on static learning, and
showed that there exists a unique equilibrium point of the
user subscription dynamics at which the number of subscribers
does not change. We provided a sufficient condition on the
entrant’s QoS function that ensures the global convergence of
the user subscription dynamics. We also examined the revenue
maximization problem by the NSPs. With no incumbent in the
market, we derived upper and lower bounds on the optimal
price and the resulting market share that maximize the entrant’
revenue, for a non-increasing PDF of the users’ valuations
of QoS. With one incumbent in the market, we studied
competition between the two NSPs, primarily focusing on
market share competition. We modeled the NSPs as strategic
players in a non-cooperative game where each NSP aims
to maximize its own revenue by choosing its market share.
We obtained a sufficient condition that ensures the existence
of at least one NE of the game. Finally, we formalized the
problem of entry and spectrum sharing scheme selection for
the entrant and provided numerical results to complete our
analysis. Our analysis provides the entrant with a quantitative
guideline as to whether to enter a communications market
and which technology to select such that it can maximize its
long-term profit. Future research directions include, but are
not limited to: (1) multiple incumbents and/or entrants in the
market; (2) general QoS functions for the incumbents; and (3)
social welfare maximization.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To facilitate the proof, we first define h˜m(λ2) = hm(λ2)−
λ2 for λ2 ∈ [0, 1], where hm(·) is defined in (3). By Definition
1, λ∗2 is an equilibrium point if and only if it is a root of h˜m(·).
Hence, it suffices to show that h˜m(·) has a unique root on its
domain.
Suppose p2 = 0. Then hm(λ2) = 1 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, h˜m(1) = 0 while h˜m(λ2) > 0 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1). This
implies that λ2 = 1 is the unique root of h˜m(·).
Suppose 0 < p2 ≤ βg(1). By the fundamental theorem of
calculus, F (·) is differentiable on (0, β) with F ′(·) = f(·).
By applying the chain rule, we have
dhm(λ2)
dλ2
= f
(
p2
g(λ2)
)
g′(λ2)p2
[g(λ2)]2
(42)
for all λ2 ∈ (0, 1). By Assumption 1, g′(·) ≤ 0 on (0, 1),
and thus dhm(·)/dλ2 ≤ 0 on (0, 1). Since dh˜m(·)/dλ2 =
dhm(·)/dλ2 − 1, h˜m(·) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1]. Next,
we note that h˜m(0) = hm(0) = 1 − F (p2/g(0)) ≥ 0 and
h˜m(1) = −F (p2/g(1)) < 0. Since h˜m(·) is continuous on
[0, 1], we obtain a unique root of h˜m(·) on [0, 1] by applying
the intermediate value theorem.
Suppose βg(1) < p2 < βg(0). Let λ¯2 = min{λ2 ∈
[0, 1]|βg(λ2) ≤ p2}. Note that λ¯2 ∈ (0, 1). Also, hm(λ2) = 0
for all λ2 ≥ λ¯2, and thus h˜m(λ2) = −λ2 < 0 for all λ2 ≥ λ¯2.
Hence, if a root of h˜m(·) exists, it must be in [0, λ¯2). By
applying a similar argument as above to the interval [0, λ¯2],
we can show that h˜m(·) has a unique root on [0, λ¯2].
Suppose p2 ≥ βg(0). Then hm(λ2) = 0 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, h˜m(0) = 0 while h˜m(λ2) < 0 for all λ2 ∈ (0, 1]. This
implies that λ2 = 0 is the unique root of h˜m(·). 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We prove the convergence of the user subscription dynamics
in the market with no incumbent based on the contraction
mapping theorem.
Definition 4 [24]: A mapping T : X → X , where X is a
closed subset of Rn, is called a contraction if there is a real
number κ ∈ [0, 1) such that
‖T(x1)−T(x2)‖ ≤ κ‖x1 − x2‖, ∀ x1, x2 ∈ X , (43)
where ‖ · ‖ is some norm defined on X .
Proposition 1.1 in Chapter 3 of [24] shows an important
property of a contraction mapping T that the update sequence
generated by xt+1 = T(xt), t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., converges to a
fixed point x∗ satisfying T(x∗) = x∗ starting from any initial
value x0 ∈ X . To prove Theorem 1, we shall show that the
function hm(·), defined in (3), is a contraction mapping on
[0, 1] with respect to the absolute value norm if the condition
(6) is satisfied.
Suppose p2 = 0. Then hm(λ2) = 1 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1], and
thus hm(·) is a contraction with κ = 0.
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Suppose p2 > 0. Let λ2,a and λ2,b be two different real
numbers arbitrarily chosen from the interval [0, 1], and suppose
without loss of generality that λ2,a > λ2,b. We will show that
|hm(λ2,a)− hm(λ2,b)| ≤ κm|λ2,a − λ2,b|, (44)
where κm = K · maxλ2∈[0,1]{−g′(λ2)/g(λ2)}. Then the
condition (6) implies that κm ∈ [0, 1), establishing that hm(·)
is a contraction. Since 0 < p2/g(λ2,b) ≤ p2/g(λ2,a), we can
consider three cases.
Case 1 (p2/g(λ2,a), p2/g(λ2,b) < β): Note that hm is
continuous on [0, 1] and differentiable on (λ2,b, λ2,a). Hence,
by the mean value theorem, there exists λ2,c ∈ (λ2,b, λ2,a)
such that
h′m(λ2,c) =
hm(λ2,a)− hm(λ2,b)
λ2,a − λ2,b . (45)
Then we obtain
|hm(λ2,a)− hm(λ2,b)| (46)
=
∣∣∣∣f
(
p2
g(λ2,c)
)
p2
g(λ2,c)
g′(λ2,c)
g(λ2,c)
∣∣∣∣ |λ2,a − λ2,b| (47)
≤ κm|λ2,a − λ2,b|. (48)
Case 2 (p2/g(λ2,b) < β ≤ p2/g(λ2,a)): Let λ¯2 =
min{λ2 ∈ [0, 1]| βg(λ2) ≤ p2}. Note that λ2,b < λ¯2 ≤ λ2,a.
Applying the mean value theorem to hm(·) on the interval
[λ2,b, λ¯2] yields
|hm(λ¯2)− hm(λ2,b)| ≤ κm|λ¯2 − λ2,b|. (49)
Since hm(λ¯2) = hm(λ2,a) = 0 and κm ≥ 0, we obtain
|hm(λ2,a)− hm(λ2,b)| = |hm(λ¯2)− hm(λ2,b)|
≤ κm|λ¯2 − λ2,b|
≤ κm|λ2,a − λ2,b|.
(50)
Case 3 (p2/g(λ2,a), p2/g(λ2,b) ≥ β): In this case,
hm(λ2,a) = hm(λ2,b) = 0, and (44) is trivially satisfied. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To prove Proposition 2, we shall show that a solution λ∗∗2
of maxλ2∈[0,1] F−1(1 − λ2)g(λ2)λ2 satisfies 0 < λ∗∗2 ≤ 1/2.
Then F−1(1/2) ≤ α∗ < β follows from the relationship α∗ =
F−1(1−λ∗∗2 ) and F−1(1/2)g(1/2) ≤ p∗2 < βg(0) from p∗2 =
α∗g(1 − F (α∗)). Note first that λ∗∗2 cannot be zero because
the maximum revenue is positive. Thus, it remains to show
λ∗∗2 ≤ 1/2.
Let z(λ2) = F−1(1−λ2) for λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then z(·) is differ-
entiable on (0, 1) with the derivative z′(λ2) = dz(λ2)/dλ2 =
−1/f(z(λ2)). Note that z′(λ2) < 0 for all λ2 ∈ (0, 1), which
implies that z(·) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1]. Also, since
f(·) is non-increasing on [0, β], z′(·) is non-decreasing on
(0, 1). The revenue of NSP S2 can be expressed as a function
of λ2, R2(λ2) = λ2g(λ2)z(λ2). Since R2(·) is differentiable
and λ∗∗2 ∈ (0, 1) (λ2 = 1 yields zero revenue and thus cannot
be optimal), the first-order necessary condition implies that
dR2(λ
∗∗
2 )
dλ2
= [z(λ∗∗2 ) + λ
∗∗
2 z
′(λ∗∗2 )] g(λ
∗∗
2 )
+ λ∗∗2 z(λ
∗∗
2 )g
′(λ∗∗2 ) = 0.
(51)
Note that λ∗∗2 z(λ∗∗2 )g′(λ∗∗2 ) ≤ 0. Thus, z(λ∗∗2 )+λ∗∗2 z′(λ∗∗2 ) ≥
0. By the mean value theorem, there exists λˆ2 ∈ (λ∗∗2 , 1) such
that z(λ∗∗2 ) = z(λ∗∗2 )−z(1) = z′(λˆ2)(λ∗∗2 −1). Then we have
0 ≤ z(λ∗∗2 ) + λ∗∗2 z′(λ∗∗2 ) (52)
= z′(λˆ2)(λ
∗∗
2 − 1) + λ∗∗2 z′(λ∗∗2 ) (53)
≤ z′(λ∗∗2 )(λ∗∗2 − 1) + λ∗∗2 z′(λ∗∗2 ) (54)
= z′(λ∗∗2 )(2λ
∗∗
2 − 1), (55)
which implies λ∗∗2 ≤ 1/2. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We consider two cases depending on the relative values of
p1/q1 and p2/g(0).
Case 1 (p1/q1 ≤ p2/g(0)): Let λ∗1 = 1 − F (p1/q1)
and λ∗2 = 0. Since p1/q1 ≤ p2/g(λ∗2), hd,1(λ∗1, λ∗2) and
hd,2(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2) are determined by (22) and (23), respectively.
Thus, hd,1(λ∗1, λ∗2) = λ∗1 and hd,2(λ∗1, λ∗2) = λ∗2, and by
Definition 3, (λ∗1, λ∗2) is an equilibrium point. By the non-
increasing property of g(·), we have p1/q1 ≤ p2/g(0) ≤
p2/g(λ2) for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the user subscription
dynamics in Case 1 is described by (22) and (23). This
establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium point (λ∗1, λ∗2),
because hd,i(·) cannot take a value different from λ∗i , for
i = 1, 2.
Case 2 (p1/q1 > p2/g(0)): Since hd,2(·) is independent of
λ1, we can express hd,2(·) as a function of λ2 only:
hd,2(λ2) =
{
F
(
p1−p2
q1−g(λ2)
)
− F
(
p2
g(λ2)
)
if p1
q1
> p2
g(λ2)
,
0 otherwise.
(56)
Note that hd,2(·) is continuous and non-increasing on [0, 1].
Let h˜d,2(λ2) = hd,2(λ2)−λ2 for all λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then h˜d,2(·)
is continuous and strictly decreasing on [0, 1]. Since p1/q1 >
p2/g(0), we have
h˜d,2(0) = hd,2(0)− 0 = F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(0)
)
− F
(
p2
g(0)
)
> 0.
(57)
Also,
h˜d,2(1) = hd,2(1)− 1
=
{
F
(
p1−p2
q1−g(1)
)
− F
(
p2
g(1)
)
− 1 if p1
q1
> p2
g(1) ,
−1 otherwise.
(58)
Hence, h˜d,2(1) ≤ 0, and there exists unique λ∗2 ∈ (0, 1]
such that hd,2(λ∗2) = λ∗2. Suppose that p1/q1 ≤ p2/g(λ∗2).
Then λ∗2 = hd,2(λ∗2) = 0, which is a contradiction.
Hence, λ∗2 must satisfy p1/q1 > p2/g(λ∗2). Let λ∗1 =
F ((p1 − p2)/(q1 − g(λ∗2))). Then it is easy to verify that
(λ∗1, λ
∗
2) is an equilibrium point. This equilibrium point is
unique because λ∗2 is the unique fixed point of hd,2(·). 
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For notational convenience, we use hd,1(λ2) and hd,2(λ2)
instead of hd,1(λ1, λ2) and hd,2(λ1, λ2), respectively, since
they are independent of λ1. Note that hd,1(·) is a non-
decreasing function of λ2 while hd,2(·) is a non-increasing
function of λ2. Define a mapping hd : Λ→ Λ by
hd(λ1, λ2) = (hd,1(λ2), hd,2(λ2)) . (59)
To prove Theorem 2, we shall show that the mapping hd(·) is
a contraction on Λ with respect to the maximum norm [24] if
the condition (26) is satisfied.
Let λa = (λ1,a, λ2,a) and λb = (λ1,b, λ2,b) be two different
vectors arbitrarily chosen from the set Λ, and suppose without
loss of generality that λ2,a ≥ λ2,b. We will show that
‖hd(λ1,a, λ2,a)− hd(λ1,b, λ2,b)‖∞ ≤ κd ‖λa − λb‖∞ , (60)
where κd = K·maxλ2∈[0,1] {[−g′(λ2)/g(λ2)] · [q1/(q1 − g(λ2))]}.
Then the condition (26) implies that κd ∈ [0, 1), establishing
that hd(·) is a contraction. Since p2/g(λ2,b) ≤ p2/g(λ2,a),
we can consider three cases.
Case 1 (p2/g(λ2,a), p2/g(λ2,b) < p1/q1): In this case, both
hd(λ1,a, λ2,a) and hd(λ1,b, λ2,b) are determined by (20) and
(21). Hence,
‖hd(λ1,a, λ2,a)− hd(λ1,b, λ2,b)‖∞ (61)
= max
i=1,2
{|hd,i(λ2,a)− hd,i(λ2,b)|} (62)
= max
{
F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,b)
)
− F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,a)
)
,
F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,b)
)
− F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,a)
)
+F
(
p2
g(λ2,a)
)
− F
(
p2
g(λ2,b)
)}
(63)
= hd,2(λ2,b)− hd,2(λ2,a) . (64)
Note that (60) is trivially satisfied if λ2,a = λ2,b. Thus,
we assume that λ2,a > λ2,b. We first consider the case
where 0 < p2/g(λ2,b) ≤ p2/g(λ2,a) < β and 0 < (p1 −
p2)/(q1 − g(λ2,a)) ≤ (p1 − p2)/(q1 − g(λ2,b)) < β so that
hd,2(·) is differentiable on (λ2,b, λ2,a). Then by the mean
value theorem, there exists λ2,c ∈ (λ2,b, λ2,a) such that
hd,2(λ2,b)− hd,2(λ2,a) = h′d,2(λ2,c)(λ2,b − λ2,a). Therefore,
‖hd(λ1,a, λ2,a)− hd(λ1,b, λ2,b)‖∞ (65)
=
{
− f
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,c)
)
(p1 − p2) g′(λ2,c)
[q1 − g(λ2,c)]2
(66)
− f
(
p2
g(λ2,c)
)
p2g
′(λ2,c)
(g(λ2,c))2
}
|λ2,a − λ2,b| (67)
≤ K
[
− g
′(λ2,c)
q1 − g(λ2,c) −
g′(λ2,c)
g(λ2,c)
]
|λ2,a − λ2,b| (68)
= K
[
−g
′(λ2,c)
g(λ2,c)
· q1
q1 − g(λ2,c)
]
|λ2,a − λ2,b| (69)
≤ κd ‖λa − λb‖∞ . (70)
The cases where 0 < p2/g(λ2,b) ≤ p2/g(λ2,a) < β or 0 <
(p1−p2)/(q1−g(λ2,a)) ≤ (p1−p2)/(q1−g(λ2,b)) < β does
not hold can be covered as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Case 2 (p2/g(λ2,b) < p1/q1 ≤ p2/g(λ2,a)): In this
case, hd(λ1,a, λ2,a) is determined by (22) and (23), while
hd(λ1,b, λ2,b) is determined by (20) and (21). Hence,
‖hd(λ1,a, λ2,a)− hd(λ1,b, λ2,b)‖∞ (71)
=max
{
F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,b)
)
− F
(
p1
q1
)
, (72)
F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,b)
)
− F
(
p2
g(λ2,b)
)}
(73)
=F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − g(λ2,b)
)
− F
(
p2
g(λ2,b)
)
(74)
=hd,2(λ2,b)− hd,2(λ2,a) (75)
Let λ¯2 = min{λ2 ∈ [0, 1]| g(λ2)p1/q1 ≤ p2}. Note that
λ2,b < λ¯2 ≤ λ2,a. Again, we focus on the case where 0 <
p2/g(λ2,b) ≤ p2/g(λ¯2) < β and 0 < (p1−p2)/(q1−g(λ¯2)) ≤
(p1 − p2)/(q1 − g(λ2,b)) < β, while omitting the other cases.
Applying the mean value theorem to hd,2(·) on the interval
[λ2,b, λ¯2] yields
|hd,2(λ¯2)− hd,2(λ2,b)| ≤ κd|λ¯2 − λ2,b|. (76)
Since hd,2(λ¯2) = hd,2(λ2,a) = 0 and κd ≥ 0, we obtain
‖hd(λ1,a, λ2,a)− hd(λ1,b, λ2,b)‖∞ (77)
=|hd,2(λ2,a)− hd,2(λ2,b)| (78)
=|hd,2(λ¯2)− hd,2(λ2,b)| (79)
≤κd|λ¯2 − λ2,b| ≤ κd|λ2,a − λ2,b| (80)
≤κd ‖λa − λb‖∞ . (81)
Case 3 (p2/g(λ2,a), p2/g(λ2,b) ≥ p1/q1): In this case,
both hd(λ1,a, λ2,a) and hd(λ1,b, λ2,b) are determined by (22)
and (23). Hence, hd(λ1,a, λ2,a) = hd(λ1,b, λ2,b) = (1 −
F (p1/q1), 0), and (60) is trivially satisfied. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let G˜′C = {Si, Ri(λ1, λ2), λi ∈ [0, 1/2] | i = 1, 2}. Since
f(·) is non-increasing, the set of NE of G˜C is equal to
that of G˜′C by Lemma 1, and thus it suffices to prove the
existence of NE of G˜′C . Since [0, 1/2]2 ⊂ Λ, the expression of
Ri(λ1, λ2) in G˜′C is given by Ri(λ1, λ2) = λipi(λ1, λ2), for
i = 1, 2. Since f(·) is continuously differentiable on [0, β],
Ri(·) is twice continuously differentiable on [0, 1/2]2. The
second-order mixed partial derivatives of R1(·) and R2(·)
are given by the negative of the left-hand sides of (36)
and (37), respectively. Therefore, (36) and (37) imply that
∂2Ri(λ1,λ2)
∂λ1∂λ2
≤ 0, for all (λ1, λ2) ∈ [0, 1/2]2, for all i = 1, 2.
Consider a transformed game of G˜′C ,
G˜′′C =
{
S1,S2, R˜1(µ1, λ2), R˜2(µ1, λ2),
µ1 ∈ [−1/2, 0], λ2 ∈ [0, 1/2]
}
,
(82)
where R˜i(µ1, λ2) = Ri(−µ1, λ2) for all (µ1, λ2) ∈
[−1/2, 0]× [0, 1/2], for i = 1, 2. Since R˜1(·) and R˜2(·) are
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continuous in both arguments and have increasing differences
in (µ1, λ2) and in (λ2, µ1), respectively, G˜′′C is a supermodular
game [26]. Therefore, G˜′′C has at least one pure NE, and G˜′C
also has a corresponding NE. 
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